执政党软权力建构探析

软权力理论不仅适用于国际政治领域,而且还可运用于国内政治治理。目前,中国共产党执政过程中面临着腐败、社会不公正、官民缺乏政治互信等问题,因此通过提升执政党的执政价值观的认同性,有效治理腐败,解决发展后问题等途径和对策,加强执政党的软权力建设,以更好地巩固党的执政地位和维护社会稳定就显得尤其必要。     

激励性和惩罚性交通拥堵治理政策的比较——基于动态演化博弈模型及仿真分析

随着城市化的快速发展，城市人口越来越多，私家车保有量急剧增长，这使得城市道路拥堵问题变得越来越严重，拥堵问题成为了城市健康可持续发展的重要阻碍。为了缓解交通拥堵，城市管理者基于不同的治理思路提出并实施了多项治理政策。本文从博弈论的角度阐述了交通拥堵的形成，并建立了一个出行者交通方式选择行为的演化博弈模型，揭示了不同治理措施对城市交通拥堵问题施加影响的过程，并对这些影响的结果做出了解释。该演化模型将出行者整体分为两类，一类表现为公交偏好，另一类为私家车偏好，我们分析在不同的交通拥堵治理政策下，出行者选择不同出行模式的成本和收益，得到随政策变化的收益矩阵，并分析两类出行者在不同政策下的演化稳定策略。为了更为直观地对演化过程及结果进行分析，我们对该模型进行了仿真模拟，最终发现惩罚和激励措施都能缓解交通拥堵，但在迅速性和持久性上，惩罚性措施比激励性措施更为有效。     

论中国在全球农业治理中的角色

党的十九大胜利召开,为中国外交指明了方向,越来越丰富的全球议题被纳入全球治理框架下,其中全球农业治理在全球治理体系中的作用与影响日渐突出。 中国作为新兴经济体,通过“南南合作”以及“一带一路”倡议参与全球农业治理,文章从农业合作机制、农业发展援助、农业科技与机制创新、农业投资与贸易四个维度分析中国在全球农业治理的理论与实践,认为农业合作机制是参与全球农业治理的重要保障,发展援助是全球农业治理新的切入点,农业科技与机制创新为全球农业治理提供技术支撑,农业投资与贸易是促进全球农业全产业链发展的重要引擎。 通过分析农业领域提供的中国方案,探索完善有中国特色的新型全球农业治理体系的新思路。     

新中国成立70周年与全球教育创新——“第三届全球教育50人论坛”综述

为深化全球教育视野下的中国教育改革，解决中国教育改革当中的重点、热点和难点问题，探索未来全球教育改革发展趋势，提升中国教育在世界的领导力，在新中国成立70周年之际，西南大学、"全球教育50人论坛"、清华大学民生经济研究院联合清华大学当代中国研究中心、清华大学社会与金融研究中心、西南财经大学资本市场研究院及小平故里书院在西南大学举办"第三届全球教育50人论坛"。大会以主题报告和分论坛讨论的形式进行。主题报告以国际视野中的中国教育和全球教育创新前沿为主题，深入探讨了全球教育创新背景下我国教育改革的路径与目标；分论坛以大学治理与全球教育创新、科技革命与全球教育创新为主题，对大学治理、科技革命对教育改革与发展的影响以及如何应对等进行了深入讨论。     

“中小学”之外：应试教育生成与治理的立基点

在“中小学”内部寻求应试教育根源的流行做法很难揭示这种教育生成的内在机理。根据系统科学自组织理论可知，当下中国应试教育的生成主要取决于“中小学”之外的两大序参量：一是“垄断性就业部门”和与之相适应的“人员评价流动机制”，二是“垄断性公立高校”近乎一统天下的办学格局。因此，要破除应试教育，须围绕这两个序参量着力。     

从“官吏分途”到“层级分流”:帝国逻辑下的中国官僚人事制度

魏晋南北朝以来的“官吏分途”是中国官僚体制的重大制度变迁,本文从这一角度出发,审视当代中国官员的空间流动状况,提出以“官吏相对谱系”为特点的“层级分流”模式。文章从周雪光的“帝国逻辑”分析框架出发,借用史学研究和社会科学理论来认识和解释人事制度安排与帝国治理逻辑之间的关系。文章认为,从“官吏分途”到“层级分流”,这一人事制度造成了官僚体制的二元结构及其迥然不同的职业生涯、激励设置和利益群体,为中国官僚体制的运作打上了鲜明烙印。本文充实和扩展了“帝国逻辑”的理论思路。     

Bending but Not Breaking?: Foreign Investor Pressure and Dividend Payouts by Japanese Firms

This article examines the global diffusion of shareholder‐oriented governance practices, using the case of dividend payouts by Japanese firms. While Japanese firms previously retained profits for rainy days or new ventures, their dividend payouts began to increase in the 1990s, rapidly catching up with the levels prevailing in the United States. Following prior research, we focus on the role of foreign investors in this process but provide a more nuanced account of their influence, using panel data on 2,036 publicly traded Japanese firms from 1990 to 2005. First, we show that pressure from foreign investors increased dividends by Japanese firms not only directly but also indirectly, by extending the cognitive boundaries of organizational fields of Japanese firms beyond their local peers and toward their global competitors. Second, we show that although Japanese firms that remained deeply embedded in the traditional, stakeholder‐oriented governance system resisted shareholder‐oriented governance practices, even such firms yielded under pressure from both foreign and domestic investors. We conclude with theoretical implications of our findings for the literature on the global diffusion of shareholder value and its broader political and social consequences.     

Corporate social responsibility and conflicts of interest in the alcohol and gambling industries: a post‐political discourse?

The corporate pursuit of social goals – known as Corporate Social Responsibility or ‘CSR’ – has been subject to critique on a number of grounds. However, a hitherto underexplored potential consequence of CSR has been suggested in a recent paper by C. Garsten and K. Jacobsson (‘Post‐Political Regulation: Soft Power and Post‐political Visions in Global Governance’ (2013), Critical Sociology 39: 421–37). They suggest that CSR is part of an international trend towards ‘post‐political’ governance discourses, where an emphasis on different actors’ common goals obscures conflicts of interest, subverting the open political conflict necessary for a well‐functioning democracy. This paper examines whether such post‐political discourses – including an outright denial of conflict of interest – can be found within the alcohol and gambling industries, where conflicts of interest are likely to be particularly acute given the addictive nature of the goods/services in question. Based on interviews with CSR professionals in these industries in Italy, the UK, and at EU‐level, we do indeed find evidence of a post‐political discourse. In these discourses, alcohol/gambling industry staff deny potential conflicts of interest on the basis that any small benefits from sales to a small number of addicts are seen to be outweighed by the reputational damage that addicts cause. Crucially, however, this coexists with another, less post‐political discourse, where addictions CSR professionals emphasize ‘common ground’ as a basis for CSR, while accepting some instances of possible conflict of interest. Here interviewees make considerable efforts to differentiate good (sustainable) from bad (short‐term) self‐interest in order to stress the genuineness of their own actions. We conclude the paper by considering whether CSR embedded within a ‘common ground’ discourse still hides conflicts of interests and subverts democratic debate, or overcomes the problems identified by Garsten and Jacobsson.     

What Nonprofit Executives Want and What They Get from Board Members

In theory, nonprofit boards of directors exist to perform mission‐setting and oversight functions that help to ensure organizational accountability. Yet there is evidence that board behavior often falls short of this ideal. Using survey data from a sample of 241 executive directors of nonprofit agencies, we investigated whether nonprofit boards are meeting executive directors’ expectations, and if not, what factors explain this? We find that although board behavior tends to align closely with executive directors’ preferences for involvement in administration and management tasks, there is a greater disconnect between board behavior and executive directors’ preferences for involvement in mission‐setting and oversight duties. Factors that mitigate this gap include organizational professionalization and stability, whereas more extensive reliance on government funding exacerbates it. Female executive directors experience a greater disconnect in their preferences for board involvement and actual board involvement than male executive directors. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.